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UNDUE PROCESS: CONGRESSIONAL 
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IN THE SCHIAVO CONTROVERSY 
Adam M. Samaha* 
The congressional response to the Schiavo controversy was 
both extraordinary and feeble. It surely was exceptional in its 
speed and specificity. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of 
Theresa Marie Schiavd was introduced and approved within a 
weekend-just days after the feeding tube was removed from 
Schiavo's body, and only a month after her husband obtained a 
state court order for that purpose.2 The legislation, moreover, 
could not have been more targeted. The statute's content fol-
lowed its title, granting certain litigation privileges to the parents 
and Schiavo alone. Congress had legislated in a one-case-only 
fashion before, of course.3 But private bills tend to resolve con-
troversies. The Schiavo Act, even on its broadest conceivable 
reading, could do nothing to settle the dispute it addressed. It 
was meant to unsettle the situation, which the federal courts 
promptly refused to do. 
This kind of congressional action-dealing with a single pri-
vate dispute and disrupting prior judicial conclusions without 
implementing new substantive law-is unlikely to recur with any 
frequency. The Act was more high drama than emerging model. 
And it is surprisingly difficult to tell whether the federal courts 
legitimately avoided a more thorough evaluation of the parents' 
claims. The constitutionality of the Act is open to good-faith dis-
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Emily Buss, Dan Farber, Saul Levmore, Cara Robertson, lior Strahilevitz, David 
Strauss, Cass Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule for their comments. Shane Davis provided 
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1. Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
2. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003, 2005 WL 459634, at *2 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 25, 2005). A similar order issued five years earlier and was affirmed, 
see In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. a. App. 2001 ), but fur-
ther litigation and legislation kept Schiavo alive, see Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 326-
28 (Fla. 2004). 
3. See infra note 28 (discussing private bills). 
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agreement.4 So it could be that the decision costs associated with 
analyzing the constitutional question at this late date are not 
worth the value of knowing the right answer. 
This concern about decision costs is linked to a much larger 
problem, however-a problem fortuitously central to a sound 
evaluation of the Schiavo Act, and essentially unexplored by 
commentators. The issue is "undue process" in government deci-
sion making. We know that process can be too costly as a matter 
of policy. Decision costs are just as real as error costs, and there 
is a well-understood difference between maximizing process and 
optimizing process.5 But is excessive process, like inadequate 
process, a constitutional problem? For all government institu-
tions and for every threatened private interest? Are courts ap-
propriate agents for policing undue-process violations? Despite 
its impressive peculiarities, passage of the Schiavo Act is an ap-
propriate occasion on which to ask these questions. 
I. WHAT CONGRESS DEMANDED 
The content of the Schiavo Act was, in many ways, trivial. 
This fact hardly penetrated the intense public debate about the 
proper outcome of the dispute-whether Schiavo, who had been 
diagnosed as stranded in a persistent vegetative state for years, 
should die quickly in accord with her husband's position; or 
whether she should remain alive and attached to a feeding tube 
in the hope of some improvement in her condition, as her par-
ents requested. The Act's modest objective nonetheless affects 
an evaluation of its lawfulness. 
Congress offered no new claim on which Schiavo or her 
parents could obtain a judicial remedy. The Act was perfectly 
explicit on this point. It was to have no effect on substantive 
law.6 Nor did the statute direct courts to reach a congressionally 
4. See Michael P. Allen, Congress and Terri Schiavo: A Primer on the American 
Constitutional Order?, 108 W.VA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 8); Steven 
G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense of the Special Law Enacted by Congress 
and President Bush, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 151,153 (2006). 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 54-59. 
6. See § 5, 119 Stat. 15 ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create substan-
tive rights not otherwise secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States or of 
the several States."); see also id. § 1 (conferring subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate 
claims alleging that Schiavo's rights had been violated "under the Constitution and laws 
of the United States"). Other sections of the Act prohibited interpretations that would 
confer additional jurisdiction to consider assisted suicide cases, see id. § 6, disclaimed 
precedential status for future legislation (for whatever practic:a! ~alue that might hav~ ), 
see id. § 7, held harmless rights under the Patient Self-Detenmnation Act of 1990, see 1d. 
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favored result under existing law. Judges were no less and no 
more free after the Act to identify, interpret, and apply substan-
tive federal law. The Act did grant a federal district court juris-
diction to "hear, determine, and render judgment" on a set of 
federal claims by or on behalf of Schiavo.7 But in isolation, this 
jurisdictional grant was superfluous. The U.S. Code already con-
ferred feneral federal question jurisdiction on the federal district 
courts. And while the Act sternly announced that the district 
court "shall issue such declaratory and injunctive relief as may 
be necessary to protect the [relevant] rights of Theresa Marie 
Schiavo," this command applied only "[a]fter a determination of 
the merits"9 and it added little if anyt~ to the court's pre-
existing remedial powers and obligations.1 So the Schiavo Act 
had nothing important to say about original jurisdiction, substan-
tive law, or judicial remedies. 
The objective of the statute was to facilitate the parents' 
ability to obtain a judgment on the merits of their federal claims 
in a federal court. Those lacking experience with the backwaters 
of federal courts doctrine might be puzzled that another Act of 
Congress could be necessary to achieve that end. Over the years, 
however, the federal judiciary has devised a range of tools for 
avoiding the merits of a claim. Some of these tools might be 
traced to statutory text; others cannot be. In any event, reluc-
tance to adjudicate can be found in cases involving controversial 
constitutional questions,11 previously litigated issues,12 and past 
or pending state judicial proceedings.13 The Schiavo controversy 
fit all three categories. There had been extensive prior litiga-
tion.14 Those battles culminated in a state court order directing 
§ 8, and declared a "Sense of Congress" that it "should consider" policies for a broader 
class of incapacitated people, id. § 9. 
7. ld. § 1 {addressing federal claims "relating to the withholding or withdrawal of 
food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain [Schiavo's] life"). 
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000); see also id. § 1343(a){3)-{4). 
9. § 3, 119 Stat. 15 (emphasis added). 
10. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2201{a) (authorizing declaratory judgments); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 {1971) {discussing equitable 
remedies). But cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 {limiting injunctive relief against judges). 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 478 
(1995). 
12. See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, OVILPROCEDURE 695-733 {4th ed. 2005). 
13. See generally ERWIN ClmMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICDON chs. 12-14 (4th 
ed. 2003). 
14. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 {Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001). 
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removal of the feeding tube/5 and the U.S. Supreme Court had 
just refused to stay the judgment.16 Moreover, Schiavo's parents 
were surely going to assert federal constitutional claims to keep 
her alive, arguments that were the subject of media focus and in-
terest-group action.17 Without the Act, Schiavo's parents faced 
numerous objections with exotic-sounding labels like the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Anti-Injunction Act, abstention, 
preclusion, prudential standing principles, and expiration of the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
The Act was written to clear away those sorts of hurdles to a 
judgment on the merits.18 The gist of the legislative effort is in 
the following sentence: 
In such a suit, the District Court shall determine de novo any 
claim of a violation of any [federal] right of Theresa Marie 
Schiavo ... , notwithstanding any prior State court determina-
tion and regardless of whether such a claim has previously 
been raised, considered, or decided in State court proceed-
• 19 
mgs. 
Congress granted Schiavo's parents no more than a referral to 
federal court for more process. 
II. WHAT THE COURTS DELIVERED 
Yet the Act made little difference. The courts quickly iden-
tified a rationale for dismissing the parents' suit without an ex-
tended examination of the merits, without contradicting the text 
of the Act, and without declaring the Act invalid. The mecha-
nism was denial of interim relief necessary to keep Schiavo, and 
the controversy, alive.20 
15. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003, 2005 WL 459634, at *2 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 25, 2005). 
16. See Schindler v. Schiavo, 125 S. Ct. 1622, 1622 (2005). 
17. See, e.g., Vickie Chachere, Schiavo's Parents Appeal Judge's Ruling, AP, Mar. 
22,2005. 
18. See § 1, 119 Stat. 15 (conferring subject-matter jurisdiction over certain federal 
claims in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, thus averting 
a Rooker-Feldman problem); id. § 2 (purporting to grant standing to "(a]ny parent of' 
Schiavo, to identify proper defendants, and to direct the district court to adjudicate a suit 
under the Act regardless of prior consideration in state court, abstention in favor of state 
judicial proceedings, or exhaustion of state judicial remedies); id. § 4 (authorizing suit 
within 30 days of enactment and regardless of any other time limitation). 
19. /d. § 2. 
20. See Schiavo ex reL Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 
2005) (affirming the denial of the parents' request for a temporary restraining order to 
move Schiavo to a hospital and reinsert the feeding tube, based on a poor likelihood of 
success on the merits). 
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In retrospect, judicial resistance can be accounted for-
especially for those who see federal courts as a collection of po-
litical actors operating with special uniforms but without special 
constraints on personal preferences. The dispute was controver-
sial to put it mildly, and it appeared that the general public re-
acted unfavorably to Washington's intervention. Although the 
purpose of the Act could have been constructed in a manner 
conducive to interim relief, the plain text spoke to several other 
procedural hurdles without mentioning that one.21 Moreover, the 
parents' federal claims seemed weak. The statutes they cited 
looked unhelpful;22 their procedural due process claim ran up 
against seven years of litigation; and their substantive due proc-
ess count was novel. There was little or no precedent for a stand-
alone federal constitutional right to receive food or medical 
treatment. In any event, federal courts have a (part-time) tradi-
tion of hesitation in controversial cases.23 Congress must legislate 
against this backdrop. 
At the same time, there was something bold about mooting-
by-death a national controversy, particularly one that Congress 
wanted litigated to some extent.24 Congress should have consid-
erable control over federal jurisdiction. Lower federal courts 
were not mandated by the text of the Constitution; they were au-
thorized at the option of Congress. The federal judiciary itself 
relies on statutory grants to justify its authority to adjudicate, 
and federal courts will ordinarily accept legislative adjustments 
to jurisdiction. Some subservience to legislative wishes makes 
good sense in democracies with unelected judges, especially if 
those judges exercise constitutional judicial review. Political con-
trol over jurisdiction has its dangers, but it can reduce tension 
between judicial independence and government accountability 
to popular will. A system in which courts both control their own 
21. The Act was silent on the district court's authority or duty to provide relief be-
fore reaching the merits. Prior proposals were not. See S. 653, § 5, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(passed the Senate Mar. 17, 2005) (stating that the district court "may issue a stay" of any 
relevant state court order); see also Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1227-28 (reprinting a Senate col-
loquy). 
22. See Schiavo ex reL Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1387-88 (M.D. 
Fla. 2005) (rejecting claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1164-66 (M.D. Fla. 2005) 
(rejecting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act). 
23. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam), with Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), and 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
TiiE BAR OF POLffiCS 69-71, 112-13 (1962). 
24. Stays of execution are routine where necessary to reach the merits of a first fed-
eral habeas application. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 320 (1996). 
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jurisdiction and claim final authority on matters of fundamental 
law might not be stable and it might not be normatively defensi-
ble. 
III. UNDUE PROCESS? 
Was court resistance justified by something more than self-
ish institutional prerogative? Was the Schiavo Act merely con-
troversial or also unconstitutional? These questions turn out to 
be difficult. But the constitutional issues involved are connected 
to a big question about excessive process in constitutional law. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECfiONS 
The most plausible constitutional challenge to the Act de-
pends on three interrelated arguments under one general idea. 
The general notion is about institutional roles-in short, that 
Congress behaved more like a court of appeals than a legisla-
ture. The Act did not "adjudicate" the Schiavo case in a strict 
sense. But Congress did single out one private dispute for addi-
tional review in a lower federal tribunal. Three specific argu-
ments fill out this criticism, charging Congress with (1) furnish-
ing special rules of decision for a particular case, (2) while 
burdening Schiavo's freedom to refuse medical care, and (3) re-
opening the final judgment of a state court after years of litiga-
tion. 
1. Singling Out 
When a legislature singles out one case, especially a case 
pending in court, it begins to take on the function of adjudicator. 
In crude terms, legislatures are designed to create prospective 
and generally applicable law which is interpreted and applied to 
specific cases by courts. Distinct roles track distinct institutional 
features, with legislatures composed of representatives account-
able to popular (or at least external) will, while courts are some-
what insulated from ordinary politics and built to resolve dis-
crete disputes. 
These themes are reflected in case law. For instance, federal 
courts will defend their freedom to interpret and apply existing 
law in particular cases.25 As well, Article I, Section 9's bill of at-
25. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145-48 (1871). For helpful 
analysis of Klein's ambiguities and limits, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CoNSTITUTION IN 
TIIE SUPREME CoURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 308--11 (1985) 
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tainder clause has been used to condemn legislative punishment 
of specified persons.26 And the Supreme Court recently con-
firmed that singling out one person for unfavorable treatment 
may violate the equal protection clause.27 It is at least possible, 
then, that the Act should have been judicially nullified. Congress 
intervened in one dispute, legislated new judicial proceedings for 
three potential plaintiffs and associated defendants, and con-
strained the shape of the controversy by eliminating defenses 
and requiring de novo review regardless of prior proceedings. 
Schiavo's death ended the practical life of the Act. 
But generalized separation-of-powers arguments are weak-
ened here, and not only because they have difficulty producing 
uncontested conclusions in most cases. The United States Gov-
ernment does not have and probably never has had pure institu-
tional forms. Courts generate doctrine to elaborate other posi-
tive law, for example, and Congress has enacted private bills 
from its very beginning. The first private bill was signed by 
George Washington, and the tradition of personalized redress in 
immigration and government-claims cases is still alive.28 The bar 
on bills of attainder is limited to punitive lelislative measures.29 
It is no threat to conventional private bills. And a prohibition 
more obviously applicable to the Schiavo Act-a restriction on 
(pointing out that legislation commonly prescribes rules of decision for the judiciary), 
and MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 48-49 (2d ed. 1990) (suggesting that the case limits Congress's author-
ity to direct federal courts to apply an independently unconstitutional rule). The subtle-
ties were missing from Judge Birch's concurring opinion on denial of rehearing en bane, 
which raged against Congress dictating to the courts any "rule of decision" or "standard 
of review." Thankfully the argument retreated from that broad proposition and turned to 
the Act's single-case scope. See Schiavo ex reL Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1274-
75 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2005). 
26. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 305, 
311-18 (1946) (rejecting a legislative attempt to stop paying salaries to three government 
employees after a House subcommittee found that they had engaged in "subversive ac-
tivities"). 
27. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (per curiam) 
(focusing on allegations of intentionally different treatment plus irrationality and arbi-
trariness in a dispute involving a couple's attempt to get connected to the municipal wa-
ter supply). 
28. See, e.g., An Act for the Relief of Richard W. Schaffert, H.R. 1023, 106th Cong., 
2d Sess. (passed as amended by the Senate Dec.14, 2000); 3 DONALD C. BACON, ROGER 
H. DAVIDSON & MORTON KELLER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STA1ES 
CoNGRESS 1626-27 (1995); Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1684, 
1693-1701 (1966). 
29. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977) (refusing to 
condemn legislation "merely because [it] imposes burdensome consequences"). 
30. See Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370,380 (1940). 
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"special legislation" included in some state constitutions31 -is 
absent from the federal document. In addition, the Supreme 
Court has held that a statutory "class of one" will not always vio-
late the Constitution.32 Congress's selective treatment of the 
Schiavo controversy cannot, standing alone, establish the Act's 
invalidity. The Act might have been a permissibly narrow and 
remedial intervention in a hard-luck case, consistent with part of 
the private bill tradition, and despite the husband's opposition to 
more process.33 
2. Burdening Liberty 
Criticism of the Act can be strengthened if an individual lib-
erty interest was jeopardized, which might distinguish much of 
the history of private bills. The husband's position was that 
Schiavo would not want to remain indefinitely attached to a 
feeding tube while "living" in a persistent vegetative state. And 
the Supreme Court has suggested that Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty reaches a person's choice to refuse artificially delivered 
nutrition and water.34 One might worry that the Act unconstitu-
tionally burdened Schiavo's liberty to refuse treatment by adding 
a new avenue for judicial assessment of her situation, at the be-
hest of those who were obviously opposed to the discontinuation 
of care. Although concern for "right-to-die" choices does not 
depend on Congress targeting one case, a one-case-only burden 
might be even more difficult to defend. 
But describing this criticism destroys its force. The argu-
ment turns on Schiavo's preferences before her injury (or her 
simulated post-injury preferences), which involves a factual alle-
gation that her parents rejected. At the very least, they believed 
their daughter was more mentally functional than others sup-
posed and that she would want (or actually did want) to continue 
living. To be sure, the Florida state courts disagreed. A trial 
31. See, e.g., ILL CONST. art. 4, § 13; MINN. CONST. art. 12, § 1. 
32. See, e.g., Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472; Maine Central R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of 
Maintenance of Way Employees, 813 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 
(1987); accord Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468 (1982) 
(distinguishing the bankruptcy clause's uniformity requirement); see also U.S. CONST. 
art. I,§ 8, cl. 4 & art. IV,§ 1. 
33. Cf Paramino Lumber, 309 U.S. at 375-78 (permitting a special legislative ex-
tension of time to challenge a refusal to award compensation from an employer to an 
employee). 
34. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990); see also 
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166,178 (2003) (discussing prisoners' interest in preventing 
administration of antipsychotic drugs). 
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court earlier found, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
Schiavo would have preferred to die in these circumstances.35 
Relying on prior judicial proceedings, however, presents a new 
issue. Schiavo's personal liberty interest in deciding the course 
and extent of her care was not jeopardized by legislation extend-
ing judicial process over federal claims, unless her opposition to 
additional care was a given-and it was not. 
Indeed, her parents ultimately claimed that Schiavo had a 
constitutional right to continue artificial feeding.36 This claim was 
premised on their belief that Schiavo would want (or, again, ac-
tually did want) continued care. Had that belief been factually 
accurate, more process would have advanced rather than hin-
dered the asserted liberty.37 The "procedural due process" claim 
was equally secure. According to the parents, the state courts 
provided inadequate or biased proceedings in reaching a conclu-
sion about their daughter's wishes.38 We can safely assume that a 
life or liberty interest was at stake in the state litigation, and de-
ficient process can be a constitutional violation even if the state 
reaches an accurate conclusion.39 At least nominal damages 
would then be available for the due process violation. True, sub-
stantial compensatory damages sound inappropriate insofar as 
Schiavo lacked consciousness during the allegedly flawed pro-
ceedings. And it would have made little sense to nullify the state 
court order if it represented the legally correct decision based on 
accurate factual findings. But to repeat, the parents did not ac-
cept those findings and, thus far, we have not identified a consti-
tutional barrier to their obstinacy. 
3. Unsettling Judgments 
If the above is correct, then the Act's constitutionality 
probably rests on the significance of prior judicial proceedings. 
35. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, at 9 (Fla. Cir. a. Feb. 
11, 2000). 
36. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (M.D. Fla. 
2005) ("Plaintiffs allege that 'depriving [Schiavo] of nutrition and hydration contrary to 
her wish to live is a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to life."'). The parents 
also raised Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims. See id. 
37. This seems true for the parents' free exercise of religion claim as well as their 
substantive due process claim. See Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1167-68; Schiavo ex rel. 
Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1387--88 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
38. See Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 1384--87; see also Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 
1166--67 (describing the parents' argument that decisions to stop hydration and nutrition 
require clear and convincing evidence that the incapacitated person would have made 
that decision). 
39. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,266 (1978). 
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Precisely targeted legislation is not necessarily invalid; and iden-
tifying an intolerable burden on Schiavo's liberty depends on ac-
ceptance of state court conclusions about her preferences. With-
out determining the significance of past process, no federal court 
could know whether Schiavo's (imputed) choice was being sub-
jected to outrageously atypical procedural burdens-or instead 
safeguarded by thankfully extraordinary legislative concern. But 
if state judicial conclusions deserve respect, then the Act is in 
trouble. Congress would be telling the husband, "Double or 
nothing," without the "double." 
Constitutional text does not answer this objection but case 
law provides some support. The full faith and credit clause in Ar-
ticle IV dictates respect for State A's judgments in State B's 
courts, while saying nothing about federal courts and providing 
Congress authority over the effect of a prior state proceeding. 
Still, the Supreme Court recognizes the importance of finality in 
court judgments, if the proposed basis for reopening was not es-
tablished beforehand. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 40 is the key 
case. It invalidated a federal statute insofar as it required federal 
courts to reopen final federal judgments in civil lawsuits. Con-
cluding that the statute violated separation-of-powers principles, 
the majority opinion emphasized the judicial function of actually 
deciding cases, along with founding era examples of state legisla-
tures granting new trials or otherwise interfering with the adju-
dication of particular cases.41 The Schiavo Act was similar.42 
Yet Plaut's holding does not settle the matter. First of all, 
the Schiavo controversy involved state rather than federal court 
judgments. The Plaut opinion reserved due-process-based argu-
ments as a way of limiting its holding, and its rule might stop 
short of insulating state judgments from federal statutes.43 The 
opinion also distinguished judgments of territorial courts and 
administrative agencies,44 which might suggest a category of non-
40. 514 u.s. 211 (1995). 
41. See id. at 218-19,221-23. 
42. Justice Breyer would have limited Plaut's holding to legislation targeting a small 
class of cases. See id. at 240-41 (concurring opinion); accord INS v. Otadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
9fJ6..-fJ7 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). Such targeting, which Justice Breyer used to more 
tightly analogize the federal statute to the typical judicial function, is obviously present in 
the Schiavo Act, and not necessary for a constitutional violation in the eyes of the Plaw 
majority. 
43. To be precise, the Court said it wished to avoid calling into question state legis· 
lation, see PlaUI, 514 U.S. at 226-27,234, which indicates even less about state court judg-
ments. 
44. See id. at 232. 
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Article III tribunals deserving less constitutional respect.45 Fur-
thermore, a New Deal era decision upheld federal price control 
legislation that prevented eviction pursuant to state court judg-
ments.46 
It might be hard to believe that Plaut would have come out 
the other way had the litigation been concluded in a state court. 
Federalism arguments aside, an originalist might recall that Con-
gress need not have established lower federal courts at all, and 
then wonder why it ought to have greater authority to reopen 
state court judgments in a hypothetical system dependant on 
their trial-level jurisdiction. If such reopening was forbidden in 
1789, in line with common criticism of state legislatures acting as 
appellate tribunals, then a contrary result seems difficult to sup-
port with subsequent developments. State courts might be more 
likely to err when adjudicating federal claims than are federal 
courts; but that assertion is contested47 and hardly accepted in 
contemporary Supreme Court decisions.48 
A state/federal distinction is not the only potentially rele-
vant boundary, however. Outstanding injunctions have been 
treated differently from judgments in damages actions. In Miller 
v. French,49 the Court distinguished Plaut while evaluating a fed-
eral statute that required reconsideration of prison-reform in-
junctions.50 The state trial court's order in the Schiavo case could 
be treated similarly.51 At the same time, Miller might distinguish 
itself. The opinion relies on a congressional decision to change 
the underlying rule of decision.52 But the Schiavo Act emphati-
cally does not alter the law under which the parents' claims 
would have been assessed. Substantive law was untouched. We 
45. Cf Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (upholding appel-
late jurisdiction over state court decisions); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928-29 
(1997) (cabining the federal government's authority to direct the actions of state officers, 
but distinguishing state courts); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992) 
(same). 
46. See Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 102, 106-07 (1947) (rejecting a vested 
rights argument assertedly grounded in due process, but focusing on retroactivity). 
47. See MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, 
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 271-75 (5th ed. 2002) (surveying the parity debate). 
48. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465, 493-94 n.35 (1976). 
49. 530 U.S. 327 (2000). 
50. See id. at 342-45. 
51. See supra note 2. 
52. See Miller, 530 U.S. at 342. The idea seems to be that if Congress changes sub-
stantive law, it is not directing courts to interpret and apply existing law as the legislature 
prefers. 
516 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:505 
can therefore surmise, but cannot know, how the Supreme Court 
would judge the Act. 
Narrowly stated and with attention to precedent, the consti-
tutional issue devolves into something like this: whether Con-
gress has authority to require federal courts to adjudicate federal 
claims without regard to a prior state court judgment awarding 
injunctive relief, where the federal statute does not alter the sub-
stantive rules of decision (although it does eliminate certain de-
fenses) and where one controversy is selected for special treat-
ment. But however narrow the question, the best answer is 
intertwined with the broader problem of excessive process in 
government decision making. 
B. EXCESSIVE PROCESS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
As a matter of public policy, there is no question that a de-
cision-making process can be excessive. For my purposes, "ex-
cessive" simply means too costly on net for private parties, the 
state, or both. And by "process" I mean conduct that is both 
(1) authorized bl'law, including that which may be demanded by 
private parties,5 and (2) for the purpose of reaching any gov-
ernment decision.54 Opposition to excessive process is shared by 
everyone from Ronald Dworkin to Richard Posner to Charles 
Dickens.55 In the same spirit, Mathews v. Eldridge56 famously 
53. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing criminal defendants compulsory 
process to obtain witnesses). 
54. Cf Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787--88 (1877) ("A [patentable] process is 
a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result."). This definition is 
not tied down by the substance/procedure distinction at stake in the Rules Enabling Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b). Examples of "process" include notice requirements, hearings, 
methods of information collection, decision-maker deliberation, written explanations, 
and appeals. But for now, it seems best to simplify the analysis by excluding some aspects 
of "process" most-broadly defined, such as mechanisms for financing decision-making 
and/or deterring its use-including filing fees and campaign contributions. The same can 
be said for substantive law governing elements of a claim or defense. Decision costs are 
affected by selecting rules as opposed to standards (in the law-and-economics sense, see 
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 561 
(1992)), but I make no claim about whether the Federal Constitution favors one or the 
other. 
Finally, I express no firm opinion on the degree to which some controversies should 
not be "decided" with any real finality. (Perhaps much legislative business falls into this 
category.) I will assume that a meaningful decision can be specified and is desired by all 
interested parties. 
55. See CHARLEs DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 13-14 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1996) 
[1853] (discussing the everlasting suit of Jarndyce v. Jamdyce); RONAlD DwoRKIN, A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 77-78, 84, 92 (1985) (denying rights to the most accurate possible 
procedures); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 21 (6th ed. 2003). 
56. 424 u.s. 319 (1976). 
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recognized the costs of added process as an "interest" that helps 
cabin constitutional demands for more process. 57 
It should be easy to see why caps on decision costs are at-
tractive. Whatever praiseworthy objectives a process might 
achieve-accurate information about existing law and historical 
fact, just application of law to individual cases, creation of so-
cially beneficial new law, moral legitimacy and peaceful accep-
tance of government decisions58 - those benefits come at a price. 
Losses from process are counted not only in time or dollars, but 
also opportunity costs of all kinds plus the burdens of extended 
uncertainty, delay, and conflict. These costs are widely suffered: 
by decision-makers, by other participants in the process, and by 
society.59 Our support for extensive decision-making protocols 
should then vary with circumstances, including the costs of erro-
neous judgment. 
We certainly will disagree about when the costs become ex-
cessive. But anybody should be able to cite examples of decision-
making so protracted or onerous that their tolerance for squab-
bling or hand wringing runs out. Consider the multi-forum, 
multi-decade fi~ht over nuclear waste storage at Yucca Moun-
tain in Nevada. Or the most oppressive discovery demands of 
the most aggressive litigators.61 Or the filibuster of judicial nomi-
nees-and perhaps the accompanyin~ debate on the desirability 
and constitutionality of the filibuster. 2 Or those lawsuits, agency 
rulemaking procedures, immigration proceedings,63 and even 
57. /d. at 335 {listing "the Government's interest, including ... the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail"}. 
58. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 66-83 (1988) (connecting perceptions of procedural "fairness" to 
satisfaction and compliance with outcomes); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due 
Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors 
in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 {1976} {adding individual dignity 
and equality as procedural values); Robert E. Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provi-
sional Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REv. 807, 810 {1975} 
(concentrating on accuracy in adjudication); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 
S. CAL. L. REv. 181 (2004) (emphasizing participation to foster "legitimacy"); cf 
DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 72-73, 102-{)3 (struggling to identify moral harm from in-
adequate process). 
59. See generally POSNER, supra note 55, at 563; Scott, supra note 58, at 810. 
60. See Nuclear Energy Inst. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1257-62, 1268-73 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (per curiam} (rejecting the agency's 10,000 year compliance period and remand-
ing). 
61. Cf In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 330, 333, 349 
(N.D. Cal. 1985) (refusing to compel immediate answers to about 1,000 interrogatories). 
62. But cf Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. 
COMMENT. 445,446 & n.4 (2004) (noting little past treatment by legal scholars). 
63. See Gaur v. Gonzalez, 124 Fed. Appx. 738, 743 (3d Cir. 2005} (noting that the 
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presidential elections that seem to drag on endlessly. Some ques-
tions are not worth considering for very long, and perhaps no 
question deserves to be considered for a lifetime. 
The constitutional question is not the same as the policy 
question, however. The issue we are interested in is whether fed-
eral constitutional law does or ought to contain a judicially en-
forceable norm against "undue process." Even if we could settle 
on a norm, practical questions of implementation must be re-
solved.64 Federal courts might not be the ideal institution for en-
forcing the ideal norm. It might be best if their judgment on at 
least certain aspects of the matter were either irrelevant or re-
spectful of assessments made by others. In this space I cannot 
provide all of the consideration that these issues deserve, but I 
can offer a foundation for future work. 
1. Process Floors and Ceilings in Current Law 
If forced to characterize the provisions of the U.S. Constitu-
tion as generally imposing either floors or ceilings on process, 
the choice seems easy. Our constitutional text is bursting with 
procedure. Obvious examples are the due process clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as conventionally under-
stood.65 These clauses safeguard a wide range of private losses 
and are not expressly limited to particular government actors.66 
Other commonly invoked provisions speak to process associated 
with courts, especially on the criminal side. The Fifth Amend-
ment requires indictment by grand jury in certain cases. The 
Sixth Amendment imposes on government a duty to inform the 
criminally accused of the nature of the accusation, guarantees 
confrontation of adverse witnesses and compulsory process for 
obtaining other witnesses, and ensures access to counsel. Article 
III, Section 2, establishes a right to demand trial by jury in cer-
agency initiated proceedings 16 years ago and took 9 years to decide the immigrant's ap-
peal). 
64. See, e.g., NEll.. K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT AL1ERNATIVES: OIOOSING INS1TIUTIONS 
IN LAW, EcONOMICS, AND PlJBUC POUCY 5 (1994); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSilCE IN 
Pl.AINa.ornES: A THEoRY OF AMERICAN CoNS1TIUTIONAL PRAcnCE 6 (2004); David A. 
Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 208 (1988); Cass R. 
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REv. 885, 886 
(2003). 
65. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507 (2004); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 
(1972). 
66. Courts tend to balk at supplementing rulemaking processes, however. SeeVer-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
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tain criminal proceedings, and the Seventh Amendment does 
likewise for civil trials.67 
Process floors are imposed in circumstances beyond adjudi-
cation, too. Aside from the Fourth Amendment's warrant re-
quirements, consider the processes for generating positive law. 
The institutions and procedures involved in legislation and con-
stitutional amendment are almost comically demanding, with bi-
cameralism only the first headache for proponents of change. 
Madisonian republicanism was intended, in part, to make a vir-
tue of gridlock. Granted, these machinations are not endless. We 
have two rather than three houses of Congress to approve legis-
lation, and little chance that a third house is permissible without 
a formal constitutional amendment.68 It is nevertheless difficult 
to extract from the text an overarching commitment to proce-
dural parsimony. 
Accordingly, process ceilings are less apparent. The Federal 
Constitution lacks an explicit, general commitment to limiting 
the burdens of government decision making.69 A careful search 
exposes only a few places where the document indicates that de-
cisions will be swift or final or otherwise capped as to burden. 
Criminal defendants-who enjoy guarantees of both minimum 
and maximum procedure that may increase government losses-
are immunized from double jeopardy, cannot be forced to testify 
against themselves, and must receive a speedy trial under the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Jury findings of fact may not be 
re-examined under the Seventh Amendment. And states are ob-
ligated to give full faith and credit to each other's judicial pro-
ceedings.70 But that's about it. No simple, unified, anti-process 
principle emerges from these provisions. They mix skepticism of 
big government with respect for community judgment and a 
general rule for resolving certain inter-state conflicts. 
At this date, judicial precedent adds little to the notion of 
undue process. Courts rarely address complaints from private 
parties that government has imposed unconstitutionally exces-
67. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery except as a post-
conviction penalty). 
68. Contrast the congressional committee structure and (perhaps) filibusters ended 
only by supermajority vote. See id. art. I,§ 5, cl. 2 (stating that "(e]ach House may deter-
mine the Rules of its Proceedings"). 
69. Cf GA. CoNST. art. VI,§ IX, para. I (the judiciary must provide "speedy, effi-
cient, and inexpensive resolution of disputes and prosecutions"); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12 
(guaranteeing prompt justice). 
70. Congress may dictate the effect of such proceedings. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, 
§1. 
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sive process, and they have vindicated such concerns even less 
frequently.71 There are just a handful of situations in which the 
judiciary is likely to accept undue process objections. 
Most significant, other constitutional values can be threat-
ened by lots of process. One of these values condemns invidious 
or arbitrary government action.n Courts must see something bet-
ter than animosity before they will legitimate burdens imposed 
by the state. An excessive decision-making process could violate 
this principle. The same goes for more specific constitutional 
values. No court would permit a legislature to impose height-
ened evidentiary re~uirements on free exercise claims or Asian-
American plaintiffs. Some actual free speech cases fit this 
model, too. When government wants to review the content of 
private expression before licensing its dissemination, courts im-
pose administrative obligations to respond swiftly.74 Quick re-
sponse times might actually increase the cost of a licensing 
scheme, of course, but these court decisions are still sensitive to 
the burden on private parties. Likewise in the equal protection 
field. Courts have occasionally invalidated attempts by one seg-
ment of the population to elevate the procedural hurdles that 
another segment must clear in order to make legal change, such 
as by entrenching opposition to antidiscrimination laws in state 
constitutions or city charters.75 In any event, the presence of ad-
71. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302 (2002) (denying that a temporary development moratorium, to formulate a land use 
plan, was a per se taking); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (denying certiorari in a 
case involving an inmate's claim that his long incarceration on death row would render 
his execution cruel and unusual); Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468, 475-77 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(rejecting an excessive process claim involving hearings in Medicare appeals); Angstman 
v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 575,578,917 P.2d 409,412 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (same in the 
zoning context); Mata v. Montoya, 91 N.M 20, 21, 569 P.2d 946, 947 (N.M. 1978) (reject-
ing what appears to be a non-constitutional objection in an employment dispute). But cf 
Oeveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985) ("At some point, a delay 
in the post-termination hearing would become a constitutional violation."); Barry v. Bar-
chi, 443 U.S. 55,66 (1979) (condemning delayed hearing without reason in a government 
employment dispute); Kelly v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 625 F.2d 486,490 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(holding that a nearly four-year delay in processing a disability-based benefits claim vio-
lated due process despite the agency's plea of inadequate resources); Sayles Hydro As-
socs. v. Maughan, 985 F.2d 451, 454-54 (9th Cr. 1993) (holding that a preemption claim 
was ripe: "[t]he hardship is the process itselr'). 
72. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
73. Setting aside the possibility that "strict scrutiny" might be satisfied. 
74. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
75. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 
(1967); see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 631; Qtizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. 
Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005) (striking down Nebraska's attempt to constitutionalize its 
opposition to gay marriage, without finding a federal constitutional obligation to recog-
nize it). 
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ditional process is not doing much work here. Process is merely 
one type of burden made troubling by the impact on independ-
ently valued conduct or parties. 
A smattering of other precedent intimates special concern 
for excessive process. No theme is immediately apparent in these 
cases and their significance is limited. But there is one standout. 
There is significant judicial sensitivity to delay-at least when 
the decisions of other institutions are under challenge, the pri-
vate need seems acute, and the justification for inaction under-
whelms the courts. Thus, in the context of discretionary govern-
ment benefits claims, delay is a recognized constitutional 
problem.76 Note also that land developers have had some success 
using state constitutional law against municipalities trying to 
slow the pace of change.77 Delay is obviously not a recently dis-
covered element of decision costs. Impatience for government 
responses to citizen complaints was present in the Magna Carta,78 
and our courts sometimes declare that "justice delayed is justice 
denied. "79 
Another example was discussed above: the rule against leg-
islation that retroactively reopens non-injunctive final federal 
judgments. But the rule is narrow. Nothing about it prohibits 
Congress from multiplying the grounds for reopening judgments 
if the legislation applies only prospectively.80 Due process cases 
contribute little else. One aspect of the minimum-contacts test 
76. See supra note 71 (collecting cases). 
77. See Mitchell v. Kemp, 176 A.D.2d 859, 575 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. Sup. a. App. 
Div. 1991) (invoking arbitrariness against a land-use moratorium and a delayed zoning 
ordinance). 
78. See MAGNA CARTA 'I 40 (1215) ("To no one will we ... delay right or jus-
tice."), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDNID-
UAL LIBERTIES IN TilE UNITED STATES CoNSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 1, 17 
(Richard L. Perry ed., 1959). 
79. E.g., Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1363 (8th Or. 1996) (Beam, J., concurring), 
affd, Ointon v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS 
276 (1977) (attributed to William Gladstone). The concept of delay helps illuminate a 
distinction between objections to excessive decision costs (broadly understood) and "too 
much process." Delay can generate decision costs that fall on interested parties. But an 
objection to delay will not necessarily isolate a feature of the decision-making process for 
elimination. The objection could simply be that a hearing take place sooner rather than 
later. Likewise, the best remedy for delay might not be "less process" but rather more 
resources to handle the workload. I use terms like "excessive process" loosely. I mean to 
capture the idea of decision costs, including the burden that results when government 
decision-makers act at a leisurely pace. 
80. The Plaut Court did suggest that the federal judiciary might be free to raise pre-
clusion arguments sua sponte. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 232 & n.6 
(1995). But even if this is a constitutionally protected prerogative, Congress may control 
the effect of state judgments in other state courts and may legislate preclusion rules for 
other contexts and for federal judgments. See, e.g., 28 U .S.C. § 1738. 
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for personal jurisdiction recognizes the burden imposed on de-
fendants by an inconvenient forum.81 More tangentially, consider 
state sovereign immunity. States may consent to suit by private 
parties for damages, but otherwise they are usually immune.82 
These rules have .an anti-process character in that states may opt 
out of litigation without escaping formal legal obligations. Yet 
like minimum-contacts analysis, sovereign immunity doctrine 
does not entirely shield states from process burdens. The issue is 
how, not whether, legal duties will be enforced. Finally, the 
canon for evaluating whether government has offered enough 
process identifies a competing government interest in cost con-
trol.83 But this is an interest, not necessarily a constitutional con-
cern. For that, we need to think generally about the virtues of an 
excessive process norm. 
2. Excessive Process in Theory 
Little existing law supports any wide-ranging constitutional 
norm against excessive process. Insufficient process is a far more 
prevalent force. Is this normatively desirable? We can think 
about this question from at least two perspectives: rights theory 
and structural or institutional logic. Neither provides much sup-
port for a judicially enforceable undue process claim. 
a. Fundamental rights 
If judicially enforced constitutional law should focus on a 
set of fundamental human rights, it will be difficult to make 
room for excessive process objections.84 This model sits on a con-
tentious normative claim about the character of constitutional 
law, whatever its descriptive power, and a rights theory can be 
specified in many ways. But hopefully we can avoid taking posi-
81. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); 
Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189,233-34 (1998). 
82. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755-77 (1999) (noting consent and other lim-
its); see also Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,724-29 (2003). Consti-
tutionally inspired respect for the states might also help explain some court-fashioned 
restrictions on habeas corpus. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989); Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). But these results might be too derivative-a criminal-justice-
related subset of a federalism subset of the general undue process problem. Moreover, 
these cases have generated enough procedural rules of their own to forestall any snap 
judgment that they reduce decision costs. 
83. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
84. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 96 (remarking that "neither party has any right 
against procedures more accurate than the accuracy required by" Dworkin's basic proce-
dural right, which he defines in terms of consistency in weighting risks of moral harm 
from substantive rights violations rather than a set level of accuracy). 
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tions on those matters. Assuming any such rights theory applies, 
undue process seems like a poor fit. 
Recall that an undue process objection is founded on costs 
associated with decision-making: money, time, other resources, 
uncertainty. But these costs are ubiquitous and, partly for that 
reason, ordinary. By contrast, due process claims might be more 
easily and more often affiliated with human values typically de-
nominated fundamental, like individual dignity and equal or per-
sonalized treatment. Providing a hearing in which a person or 
her advocate may explain her position might be a dignitary in-
terest of constitutional dimension.85 And even if it isn't, such par-
ticipation rights can enhance accuracy in the adjudication of sub-
stantive rights. Preventing someone from enjoying such 
participation, for the purpose of saving cash or avoiding hassle, 
cannot reach the same order of importance in a fundamental 
rights theory. This seems especially true insofar as costs are 
shouldered by government officials and anonymous taxpayers. 
Otherwise, every fundamental human right could develop an 
anti-right pushing in the opposite direction and the very notion 
of fundamentality loses meaning. 
To be sure, a theory of rights need not-and cannot, in any 
practical sense-encompass claims to maximum accuracy in the 
adjudication of rights regardless of cost. But at least the motiva-
tion for enhanced decision-making procedures is tightly con-
nected to arguably imperative concerns.86 Not so for excessive 
process concerns, or at least not necessarily so. We might imag-
ine added process that also implicates concerns like dignity and 
equal respect. Requiring only the poor to personally participate 
in hearings involving their debts would not only impose ordinary 
costs on that class; it might also carry an intolerable suggestion 
of untrustworthiness. Yet this is simply a replay of the rationale 
for derivative excess process claims: an independent commit-
ment with a high (lexical) priority is threatened by more process, 
yet only coincidently.87 The essential problem is humiliation, or 
disregard, or some other value. Process is only a vehicle for the 
injury. Even if the same doubts can be raised about rights to am-
ple process-that such rights must piggyback on our dedication 
85. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,80--81 (1972) (referring to both fair play and 
mistaken deprivations); id at n.22 (downgrading "rather ordinary costs" of process com-
pared to a right to process before a "property" deprivation takes place); Mashaw, supra 
note 58, at 49. 
86. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 76-78. 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75. 
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to other human values-this shared weakness cannot help the 
argument for rights against excessive process. 
Nothing seems to change if we concede that there is a right 
to defeat unfounded claims of right. 88 The concession indicates 
additive rights to adequate process in the service of accuracy and 
other procedural values. It need not produce rights in one party 
to minimize the procedures demanded by another party. 
b. Institutional choice and design 
The cost-based objections propelling the idea of undue 
process rest more easily within structural arguments and institu-
tional theory. A primary task for such analysis is to choose and 
design institutions that are most likely to achieve given objec-
tives.89 Costs of all sorts may be considered. Now, some might 
confine these arguments to pure policy and deny their relevance 
to constitutional law. This is not a reason to stop now, though. 
As with rights theories, so too for institutional theories: we need 
not concede decisive power to any one of them. If they all sug-
gest the same answer, we miJht reach a satisfying conclusion 
without deeper commitments. 
The critical question is what good would be done by judi-
cially cognizable undue process claims. There is no doubt that 
undesirable costs are associated with government decision-
making, and that officials will sometimes err by adding too much 
process. Indeed, high-cost decisional process might be a way for 
officials to build turf.91 Let us assume, moreover, that excessive 
process is a constitutional violation at least sometimes. The pro-
posal at issue is more pointed, however. It contemplates judicial 
intervention and, if conventional practices apply, judicial su-
premacy on the matter. Is this desirable? 
A quick answer is not possible, in part because courts might 
police any number of institutions in countless circumstances and 
because there is no simple and consensus model of official be-
88. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 96 ("When issues of substance are at 
stake, the defendant's rights begin where the plaintiff's leave off."). 
89. See, e.g., David L. Weimer, Institutional Design: An Overview, in 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1, 12 (David L. Weimer ed., 1995) (noting a dialogical strand as 
well); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Con-
gress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1280 (2001) (distinguishing institutional choice from institu-
tional design). 
90. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMAUSM ON THE 
SUPREME CoURT 249-50 (1999) (discussing incompletely theorized agreements). 
91. But cf Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005) (challenging assumptions that government tends to unjus-
tifiably expand in any systematic way). 
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havior.92 Progress nevertheless can be made with an important 
doubt: it is far from clear that leaving the issue to ordinary law 
and politics will result in serious and systematic errors. 
Without undue process claims, the system would function 
much the way it does now.93 Congress might legislate to add, sub-
tract, or otherwise modify the decision-making procedures for 
the executive branch and for the federal judiciary.94 Insofar as it 
has not, the executive and the judiciary might draft their own 
rules for their own purposes, as well as consider pleas for re-
form. 95 If the system errs and manufactures excessive protocols 
for decision, pressure for change may come from either officers 
within each of those institutions or from interested outsiders. 
And the mechanism for reform could be either internal (the ex-
ecutive or the judiciary altering their own process) or external 
(legislation or even constitutional amendment). 
Constitutional judicial review is an addition of questionable 
value. The resulting anti-procedure norms would be judicially 
approved if not wholly designed, and difficult to modify. Power 
over process might be unjustifiably skewed toward court prefer-
ences, not only within the judiciary but elsewhere. We might 
worry that officials will habitually over-economize on process to 
save themselves the hassle; constitutional text suggests as much. 
But that kind of distrust tends to distinguish due process from 
undue process claims, and it does not confront the downside of 
judicial review.96 
A court-centered approach is not all bad but it isn't a con-
vincing improvement, either. Consider a few generalizations 
about official behavior. One is that familiarity builds practical 
92. See, e.g., Nancy Maveety, The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of 
Political Science, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 1, 4-5, 33-35 (2003). 
93. The analysis here brackets Congress's internal procedures as well as state prac-
tices. 
94. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power "[t]o make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution ... all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Depart-
ment ... thereof'). 
95. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2000) (granting federal courts authority to "pre-
scribe rules for the conduct of their business," if consistent with statutes); cf Department 
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (recognizing inherent executive authority 
to restrict access to sensitive information). 
96. Nor is it apparent that pro-process interest groups will routinely dominate anti-
process interests. Certainly rule changes in civil procedure and habeas corpus include 
important efforts to streamline decision-making. Cf Freedom of Information Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (2000) (setting response times); Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 
(2000) (restricting district court injunctions if "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may 
be had in the courts of such State"). 
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knowledge. Those who repeatedly perform similar tasks in simi-
lar settings have an advantage in evaluating the consequences of 
one process over another. A second idea is that self-judgment 
can threaten the public good. Like anyone else, government offi-
cials can be selfish and irresponsible or myopic and overconfi-
dent about their own ability to perform familiar duties. Outsid-
ers might offer a more reliable assessment of work performed by 
others. To a certain extent these two ideas present an unhappy 
trade-off: competence for bias, dispassion for naivete. Courts are 
subject to these complications. They might be honest yet mis-
taken brokers, or interested yet expert players. These risks might 
be at their apex when courts are asked to evaluate the net costs 
of a decision-making method and where judges might enjoy im-
portant benefits from its absence. 
Equally important are the alternatives to constitutional law. 
Even if federal courts are reliable here-after all, they deal in 
process constantly and their partial insulation from daily politics 
can be advantageous-the objective might be achieved sub-
constitutionally. Formal amendments to statutes and rules are 
not the only alternatives. Any marginally creative method of 
statutory interpretation will provide opportunities to assess the 
consequences of first -class process, not to mention the possibility 
of common-law claims for abuse of process and the like.97 All of 
this can be done without the judiciary freezing the results with 
fundamental law. 
Finally, an undue process claim needs limitations which are 
not easy to see. Government decision-making always imposes 
costs. And familiar procedures might be left in doubt as the judi-
ciary works out the boundaries of excessive process objections. 
Attractive targets include federal habeas corpus, the discovery 
system for civil litigation, as well as an almost endless range of 
administrative procedure. It would be a miracle if all of these 
targets already operate with an optimal degree and form of 
process. This is a lot to put up for grabs.98 
97. At this time, the general rules for issue and claim preclusive effect of federal 
judicial proceedings are entirely judge-made. See supra note 80. The abstention cases are 
likewise largely the product of judicial imagination. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 13, chs. 12-14. Habeas corpus also has a long history of court-drafted barriers to 
relief; some of them might reduce decision costs. See supra note 82. 
98. Some of these arguments call into doubt existing due process doctrine. Al-
though I will leave that issue to the reader, there could be meaningful differences be-
tween due and undue process claims. The most straightforward argument would be from 
constitutional text. Whatever else they mean, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are 
widely read to impose process floors on government officials before (or after) they engi-
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Caveats are in order, however. Perhaps the judiciary need 
not be either shoved all the way into or pulled all the way out of 
undue process territory. Undue process claims might be softened 
by requiring courts to see clear error, or defer to the more-
informed judgment of other institutions. Either could reduce the 
threat of judicial mistakes. The breadth, not just the depth, of 
these claims could be moderated as well. We might identify par-
ticular instances of government decision-making when we are 
most confident that courts possess adequate competence along 
with healthy detachment. Some forms of administrative adjudi-
cation are the most plausible examples. In those cases, the deci-
sion-making process would be less foreign to the judiciary, while 
the institutional separation between agency and court presents a 
reason to trust judicial opinion at least as much as the officials 
responsible for the relevant process. On the other hand, exces-
sive process seems less likely here-assuming that agencies can-
not wholly externalize the costs of process for their own deci-
sions. 
In contrast, even moderated forms of undue process offer 
no stirring support for judicial control over judicial process. Ob-
viously courts are best informed about the operations of their 
own institution. But they are also most likely to assume trou-
bling parochial outlooks when someone complains that decision-
making should be cut short. Process imposes costs on a large 
class of people, making it easy for the judiciary to appear sympa-
thetic while serving lower-minded interests in docket clearing. In 
other words, courts might be habitually overexcited about undue 
process claims made within their own house. An independent 
judiciary can have clear advantages over other actors, but judg-
ing whether a case is too much work is probably not among 
them. Combined with democratic skepticism about unbridled ju-
dicial review, there is good reason to locate this problem of ex-
cessive decision costs in the category of ordinary law. 
neer life, liberty, and property deprivations. This does not necessitate assertive judicial 
intervention, however, especially to run the decision-making processes of other institu-
tions. Beyond text, one might try tradition, judicial precedent, the possible correlation 
with "fundamental" or otherwise disproportionately prized human values noted above, 
the possibly greater competence of courts in identifying abridgment of such values, and 
the chance that government is more likely to unjustifiably economize on its own decision-
making than mandate extravagant efforts to reach a resolution-though discounted by 
the probability that courts will systematically underestimate the burdens of process in 
non-judicial operations. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Schiavo Act was exceptional and for many reasons it 
should stay that way. There probably were few actors less likely 
to make a sound decision about the merits of the case than the 
United States Congress. That said, the Act's modest objective 
was not plainly unconstitutional and a provisional theory of "un-
due process" suggests that Congress acted within its authority. 
The statute opened the federal courthouse for additional consid-
eration of alleged rights violations, presenting the judiciary with 
more work on a matter of life, death, or something in between. 
A version to redundant litigation is a credible point in a policy 
debate, it is often reflected in sub-constitutional rules, and it is 
usually not a matter of fundamental law conjoined with judicial 
supremacy. But correctly assessing the validity of this particular 
statute is unimportant. What matters is rigorous and sustained 
thinking about how to locate the ceilings-not just the floors-of 
government process. 
